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CJlhImHmh MeHD? 
Can you hear me now? 
Signaling Theory and the Cold 
War 
Curtis Sedlacek 
Abstract: In this paper the Cold War between the United States and the 
Soviet Union is analyzed using a variation of signaling theory. The signals 
sent between the two nations were important as they could be used by both 
countries to achieve victory, defined as one system of government and 
economics triumphing over the other without direct military conflict. To 
achieve victory both countries had to signal their fitness to the people of the 
world. By treating a conflict as a collection of signals it may be possible to 
understand what signals lead to what behaviors and see these signals in the 
current relationships between nations. 
Signaling theory allows several events of the Cold War to be 
understood more clearly as the actions of each nation are interpreted as 
signals meant to convey more than just the action itself. 
Introduction 
Signaling theory has come a long way since the ideas first presented 
by Thorstein Veblen and his theories of conspicuous consumption (Veblen 
1994). The idea that a person is communicating with other people through 
more than just spoken language or the written word may seem obvious, but 
Veblen was one of the first to begin defining what forms exactly these 
nonverbal communications may take. He raised the idea that perhaps people 
were communicating with each other through the conspicuous consumption 
of goods and services, in order to prove to those both in their social groups 
and outside their social groups that they were someone who was important or 
had wealth. The conspicuous consumption of resources such as time and 
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money can be an intentional signal to others about the fitness of one 
individual compared to another. 
Out of Veblen's conspicuous consumption theory several other ideas 
have arisen. Included in these theories are Bruce Trigger's ideas about 
monumental architecture being a form of symbolic behavior (Trigger 1990), 
McGuire and Hildebrandt's ideas of costly signaling and prestige hunting in 
regards to Great Basin foragers (McGuire and Hildebrandt 2005) and Bliege-
Bird and Smith's ideas about reliable signaling of condition-dependent 
qualities in many different societies (Bliege Bird and Smith 2005). Signaling 
theory has been applied to horticultural gatherer groups and the conflicts 
between them (Roscoe 2009). 
In this paper a variation of signaling theory will be applied to a 
conflict between nations, in particular the conflict between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) during the 
Cold War in order to demonstrate that signaling theory can be successfully 
used in this context. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union was chosen because it is a conflict between two large nation states 
with an abundance of literature available that discuss all aspects of the 
conflict. 
Background 
The United States and the Soviet Union were at similar places in 
their development as nations at the end of World War II. The Soviet Union 
had emerged from the conflict with millions dead but also with one of the 
largest armies in the world. It had evolved from a "backwater" country 
struggling to modernize to a full-fledged manufacturing center of the world. 
Similarly the United States had started World War II in the grips of the Great 
Depression with one of the smaller militaries in the world, but by the end the 
United States had developed a large industrial complex and a military with 
cutting edge technology that was backed by the might of the atomic bomb. 
Both countries had been war time allies but without the common enemies of 
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan the friendship began to quickly 
deteriorate. The Soviet Union was leery of the United States monopoly on 
atomic weapons and the United States was worried that communism would 
spread like a cancer throughout the world if it was allowed to take hold in 
any other country. 
The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union would 
be fought in third world countries with intermediaries, in the crucible of 
public opinion and with a feint - counter feint of military action, a game of 
81 
chess that brought the world to the brink of fiery destruction several times. 
The decades of tensions were filled with signals of both sides, as they 
attempted to communicate various ideas and thoughts and establish 
dominance over the other without open conflict. 
Various Types of Signals 
There are various types of signals that can be sent between nation 
states. This typography was created for conflicts between nation -states. They 
are as follows: 
Forms ofIntentional Signaling 
Direct Signaling- In direct signaling, the sender informs the receiver that the 
signal is. specifically for the receiver and the signal is clear in expressing 
what the sender wants to send. 
Indirect Signaling- In indirect signaling, the sender sends a signal without 
notifying the receiver. The signal is sent with the hope that the intended 
receiver will receive it and understand the message. This form of signaling is 
dangerous as the intended receiver may not get the signal or the signal may 
be received by the wrong receiver. 
Methods of Signaling 
Third Party - In the third party method of signaling the sender uses a third 
party, usually a neutral party or ally of both the sender and the receiver to 
send the signal. This allows the sender and the receiver to maintain 
deniability if the signal is picked up by any other party. 
Through the Media - Similar to third party signaling, this form of signaling is 
when the sender and receiver communicate through the media. This allows 
the two parties to signal to each other and the world at the same time. 
Direct communication- This is when both parties signal each other directly, 
for example through phone calls between the President of the United States 
and Premier of the Soviet Union. 
History ofthe Cold War-United States 
The Cold War, a term originating with the British author George 
Orwell, began immediately at the end of World War II. It can be said that the 
Cold War began even before this time as the Allies of World War II (Great 
Britain, the United States of America, and the U. S. S.R.) had begun jockeying 
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for various positions of power and influence before the last bullets of World 
War II had even been fired. 
The concerns of the United States about communist influence 
spreading were confirmed when the Soviet Union annexed several countries 
outright (including Poland and East Germany) and installed puppets allowing 
de facto Soviet control of several other Eastern European countries (Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and others). 
Harry Truman had assumed the Presidency after the death of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and had concerns that electoral victories in 
Eastern European countries could allow communism to spread to the Western 
European countries and as such he began a policy of containment that he 
defined in the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947 
made it a policy of the United States to support people who were resisting 
subjugation by outside forces (Craig and Logeva1l2009). 
The Truman Doctrine made plain the American goal of resisting the 
spread of communism, thereby making an enemy of the Soviet Union. The 
Truman Doctrine also made clear the American strategy of containment when 
it came to stopping communism. Also, President Truman feared that if one 
country fell to communism, such as Greece, then the one next to it would 
also fall to communism, such as Turkey. This idea came to be known as the 
"domino effect" and would be a guiding principle of American policy during 
the Cold War (Snyder 1995). 
Part of the United States' response to the perceived threat of 
communist expansion was the implementation of the Marshall Plan, an 
economic reconstruction plan funded by the United States to allow war 
damaged Western European countries the chance to rebuild before 
communist movements could gain strength (Belmonte 2008). Another part of 
the United States policy that was meant to deal with the communist threat 
was the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a 
mutual defense pact between the United States, Canada, and the Western 
European countries, which ensured that any attack on one country would be 
an attack on all of them, ensuring mutual defense. 
The United States would continue to challenge the Soviet Union on 
a world-wide stage for decades, both publicly and clandestinely. Throughout 
this paper I will give several examples of these efforts to stop the expansion 
of communism. 
83 
History of the Cold War-U.S.S.R. 
The Soviet Union, led by Joseph Stalin, at the end of World War II 
had become a large military superpower after decades of being considered a 
"backwater" country, much as World War II also allowed the United States 
to emerge from the Great Depression. The Soviet Union aided reconstruction 
efforts in Eastern Europe, transforming those countries into Soviet satellite 
states and founding the Warsaw Pact in 1955, which was a mutual defense 
pact, signed by the Soviet Union and its satellite nations as a response to 
NATO (Craig and Logeva1l2009). 
The Soviet Union gained control of the eastern part of Berlin at the 
end of World War II as the result of agreements with Great Britain and the 
United States. This would prove to be a particularly contentious agreement 
as the Soviet Union tightened its control of East Germany and Berlin with the 
construction of the Berlin Wall. The Soviet Union would continue to 
challenge the United States for the next several decades through propaganda 
efforts directed at discrediting the United States, which will be discussed in 
detail later. 
Another key point that must be remembered throughout this paper is 
that both sides of the conflict were operating under the idea of Mutually 
Assured Destruction or MAD. The idea behind MAD was that if one country 
launched a nuclear strike, the other country could launch their nuclear strike 
before the first country's missiles hit, ensuring the destruction of both 
countries and most likely the world. Therefore, neither country could use 
their massive nuclear weapon arsenals for fear of being destroyed (Craig and 
Logevall 2009). 
The threat of MAD overshadowed both countries during the Cold 
War and had significant influence on the power of signals and the form in 
which they were sent. Both countries displayed a cautious nature when 
signaling each other, as neither wished to provoke the other to retaliate with 
nuclear weapons. 
Propaganda 
Propaganda is the deliberate spreading of information to help or 
harm a person, or in this case, a nation (Merriam-Webster 2011). 
Propaganda is a form of indirect signaling, as defined previously in this 
paper, but it is only effective if the source of the propaganda is not 
discovered by the receivers. If the receivers suspect that information they are 
receiving is propaganda then they will not trust it. 
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Propaganda can be divided into two different categories, internal 
propaganda and external propaganda. With internal propaganda a 
government tries to influence its own people to believe certain information, 
whether that information is how successful their country is or how evil 
another may be. In external propaganda a government is trying to influence 
non-citizens, possibly of a particular group, like a rival country's citizens or 
the world in general. Both countries during the Cold War used propaganda to 
influence public opinion against their opponent and increase public opinion 
for their own country. 
In the United States, the government ran a large public relations firm 
of 10,000 people spread throughout 150 countries, with an operating budget 
of two billion dollars per year (in 1960s dollars), all for spreading 
propaganda in favor of the United States and against the Soviet Union 
(Snyder 1995). This huge organization engaged mainly in external signaling 
aimed at the people of the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. To do this, 
massive short wave transmitters were constructed throughout the world and 
by 1986 American broadcasting corporations were broadcasting 2,411 
broadcast hours per week into the Soviet Union and its allied nations (Snyder 
1995). 
The government also used third party groups in order to send signals 
to the Soviet Union. For example, agents from the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) paid European journalists to write about plans the United 
States had to deploy neutron bombs to Europe. While the bombs were never 
deployed, the news caused concern among Soviet officials (Snyder 1995). 
The United States used its ability to propagandize to show the 
people of the Soviet Union how much better life was in the western world, 
and to call out Soviet leaders who were lying about the capabilities and 
strength of the Soviet Union. This directly conflicted with the Soviet Union's 
internal propaganda that the United States was a cesspool of violence and 
crime and the Soviet Union was the more powerful and successful of the two 
countries. Using its propaganda resources the United States was able to 
directly signal the people of the Soviet Union and show them an alternative 
to the Soviet lifestyle. 
The Soviet Union, unlike the United States, was unable to get its 
radio signals to the United States (its closest transmitter being in Cuba) and 
even when it could get radio transmissions to the United States, few people 
wanted to hear Soviet news mixed with Soviet military music. Due to these 
difficulties, the Soviet Union focused on signaling to other parties in the 
world (Snyder 1995). 
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The Soviet Union used propaganda to portray the United States as 
less than perfect and at times attempted to portray the United States 
government as evil, such as when it attempted to blame Bhopal's Union 
Carbide plant disaster of 1984 in India, in which two thousand people were 
killed, on the United States government (MSNBC 2009). Pro Soviet 
newspapers stated that the explosion happened as part of an experiment to 
see how people reacted to gas poisoning or was the result of an American 
made chemical bomb being built there (Snyder 1995). 
The Soviet Union also attempted to jam incoming American radio 
signals at an expensive cost of 1.2 billion dollars per year in electricity alone 
(Snyder 1995). This was quite a burden to a country that had lost the 
Chernobyl reactor in 1986 and was having a hard time producing enough 
electricity in order to power its factories, let alone massive radio jammers. 
Both countries spent time propagandizing to the world to signal that 
their respective ways of living were the better way. By using indirect 
signaling and signaling to third parties each country hoped to win more and 
more supporters and weaken their opponent. The ability of each respective 
country to recruit new allies forced the other to respond, much like the 
nuclear weapons build-up of that was also taking place. 
The Berlin Blockade and Airlift 
During the blockade of Berlin (24 June 1948-12 May 1949) the 
Soviet Union blocked all railway and road access points to the parts of Berlin 
that were united under Allied control, which was an attempt to force Allied 
parts of Berlin to depend on the Soviet Union for essential supplies thereby 
giving the Soviet Union de facto control over all of Berlin. The United States 
and its allies had scaled back their armies at the end of World War II, and 
were in no position to challenge the Soviet blockade with military forces 
(Craig and Logevall 2009). 
The United States and its allies were unable and unwilling to 
respond militarily, as a military response could provoke a war between the 
Soviet Union and the Allies. They chose to respond to this situation with a 
massive airlift operation in an attempt to keep West Berlin from becoming 
dependent on the Soviet Union. 
With the Berlin blockade the Soviet Union sought to show the 
United States and its allies that the Soviets had considerable political and 
military influence. The Soviet Union had spent the years since the communist 
revolution being regarded as a underdeveloped nation, but with the end of 
World War II, the Soviet Union now had vast modern military resources 
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upon which to draw and with the blockade of Berlin, the Soviet Union was 
able to signal to other nations that it was capable of exerting its will on other 
countries and on Eastern Europe specifically. The blockade also sent the 
signal, whether intentional or not, that the Soviet Union would spread its 
influence by force if necessary and it challenged the United States and allies 
to do something about it. 
The blockade of Berlin forced the United States and its allies to 
respond. The signal sent by the Soviet Union was appeared to be an honest 
one, as it was backed by a million and half soldiers stationed in Germany at 
the time but the Allies realized that the Soviet signal was really a false one, 
as these soldiers could be destroyed with one or two atomic bombs. The 
United States was reluctant to use them as it would result in the deaths of 
many German civilians but would as a weapon oflast resort. 
Besides nuclear weapons, the disassembled militaries of the West 
did not have the strength to break the blockade by force, and any attempt to 
do so would likely lead to war with the Soviet Union, a war for which the 
weary population of the United States would have little patience. 
Faced with this stalemate, the Allied nations chose to respond to the 
Soviet signal with a multi-component signal. First, their signal had to 
achieve the practical goal of supplying the people of Berlin so they would not 
starve or freeze to death. Second, the signal would also need to let the Soviet 
Union know the United States and its allies would not allow the Soviet Union 
to dictate terms through force. And third, the Allies could call the Soviet 
Union's false threat of military force, as any conflict between the 
outnumbered Allies and the large Soviet Union would force the Allies to use 
atomic bombs, a threat which the Soviet Union had no answer to at that time. 
A massive airlift was the signal that the Allies were looking for. It 
allowed the Allies to counter the Soviet signal with the multi-component 
answer they needed. It allowed to them to keep supplying Berlin without 
direct confrontation with Soviet troops. Also, it allowed them to score a 
public relations victory as the Allies were seen as saviors to the people of 
Berlin while the Soviets appeared to be the evil oppressors. This increased 
the popularity of American and Western ideas and decreased the popularity 
of the Soviet Union and along with it, communism. Another component to 
the signal that may have been unintentional is that it showed the Soviet 
Union how impotent it was to stop the airlift. Building roadblocks to stop 
Allied trucks was one thing, shooting down an Allied aircraft was another 
thing entirely (Craig and Logevall 2009). 
The Berlin Airlift was a massive success, delivering an average of 
8,000 tons of food and fuel a day (Craig and Logevall 2009). It was a direct 
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signal to the Soviet Union that the United States and its allies would not 
allow the Soviet Union to push them around with military or political 
pressure. The United States used its massive resources, both in supplies and 
in aircraft to also signal to the Soviet Union the great expense both in 
material and money that it willing to use in order to frustrate the Soviet 
Union's intention and achieve the United States' goals. The Berlin Airlift 
forced the Soviet Union to lift the blockade as it was now a pointless and 
expensive exercise and it also forced the Soviet Union to the negotiating 
table with the Allies in order to formalize the status of Berlin, which was the 
ultimate goal of the signal (Craig and Logeva1l2009). 
The Berlin Wall 
In 1952 the border between East and West Germany was closed and 
a barbed wire fence was erected, but a loop hole allowed emigration to 
continue in Berlin. After a few years of mass emigrations from East to West, 
and the subsequent brain drain that followed it, the Soviet Union found the 
situation untenable. Construction on the Berlin Wall (officially known as the 
Anti-Fascist Protection Wall by East German authorities) began on 13 
August 1961. The reasons given for the wall's construction by East German 
authorities was that the wall was needed in order to stop "fascist" elements 
from infiltrating East Berlin and challenging the will of the people, rather 
than stating its true goal of being a way to strictly enforce emigration control 
(Craig and Logevall 2009). 
The Berlin Wall was 87 miles long and its first version consisted of 
the roads being tom up and barbed wire entanglements constructed. Houses 
near it were razed and a large open space was created, which allowed for an 
open field of fire from the guards patrolling the border. The wall would go 
through several evolutions before becoming the iconic concrete wall that 
became infamous in Ronald Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983 (Federation 
of American Scientists 2011). In 1962 the wire fence was improved to stop 
defectors, the concrete wall was added in 1965, and the final version of the 
wall was constructed in 1975. The United States and their Western allies 
viewed the wall with concern as it became the physical symbol of the Iron 
Curtain that Winston Churchill warned was descending on Europe (Craig and 
Logevall 2009). 
The Berlin Wall did not fit Trigger's definition of monumental 
architecture at first (Trigger 1990). It was purely a practical construct with 
the simple purpose of stopping people from crossing the border, not the 
supra-functional aggrandizing ofa structure that is diagnostic of monumental 
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architecture as defined by Trigger (Trigger 1990). Later though, as concrete 
and guard towers were added, the structure did become a piece of 
monumental architecture. There was not a need to have a concrete wall as tall 
and thick as it was built in order to stop people from crossing the border, it 
was made larger and out of stronger, more expensive materials in order to 
signal to people on both sides of it how seriously the Soviet Union treated the 
idea of uncontrolled emigration (Trigger 1990). 
The Berlin Wall was a signal on many levels, beyond its simple 
function of physically stopping emigration. The Soviet government wanted it 
to be an internal signal of their commitment to the protection of their people, 
but it was seen by many people in East Berlin as a physical reminder of the 
restrictions on their freedom to move about as they chose. The Wall was a 
symbol of the Soviet Union's ability to physically enforce its will on its 
people. 
To the West, the Wall was a reminder of the Soviet Union's ability 
to construct a massive defensive structure right along its border and it was 
unable to do anything about it. It was a signal of challenge to the United 
States, to which the United States could do little to respond. 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 
A ballistic missile is a missile that follows a sub-orbital ballistic 
flight path with the purpose of delivering one or more warheads to a target. 
The development of these missiles combined with the development of more 
powerful nuclear warheads gave both the United States and the Soviet Union 
the capability to deliver irreparable damage to all life on Earth. It also gave 
both countries the ability to strike one another in a matter of minutes, with 
little or no warning. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union built massive ICBM 
facilities, consisting of hundreds of silos and extensive command and control 
facilities. Each nation also built thousands upon thousands of nuclear 
weapons with estimates ofthe Soviet Union weapons arsenal reaching 45,000 
warheads in 1986, much more then was required to defeat each other 
(Cochran et al. 1995). In fact each side created enough nuclear weapons to 
destroy all life on Earth several times over (Grace 1994). 
Both sides were afraid that one would out produce the other, even 
after they had reached the point where they could kill everyone on the planet. 
Though neither side could use the weapons they had built, they continued the 
costly and expensive process of building them because if the other side built 
more, they would "win". 
89 
The construction of nuclear weapons was both an internal and 
external signal. The external signal was to each other as nations, that any 
attack would be met with the total destruction of both sides. The ICBM 
systems built by both countries did not fit Trigger's requirements for 
monumental architecture when the first ones were built, as they were 
practical tactical structures, built strong enough to allow the launch of their 
deadly payload but not made to be ostentatious. The ICBM system eventually 
did meet Trigger's monumental architecture requirements when the number 
of silos and bunkers constructed far exceeded what was needed to destroy the 
enemy (Trigger 1990). After each country had the capability to completely 
destroy the other they nevertheless continued to build more silos and nuclear 
weapons to fill them in order to send a signal. 
The external signal that each country sent was that if you attack me, 
then I will destroy you, and make the rest of world uninhabitable as well, a 
signal that each side received and which was formalized in MAD. The 
continued construction of missiles also sent the lesser signal that each 
country was wealthy enough to continue to afford to build missiles that it did 
not need, a signal of wealth and prosperity sent by the conspicuous 
consumption of resources (Veblen 1994). 
There was also an internal signal that was sent to each country's 
respective people, this signal being that both the Soviet Union and the United 
States governments could protect their citizens from attack by making an 
attack so costly that nobody would dare do so. 
Each side began building the weapons in order to ensure the other 
side would not attack, but each side became victims of their signals. In order 
to ensure that they fulfilled their promise of protection to their citizens they 
were forced to continue building them at the expense of other programs that 
could have used the money and in both countries there was the fear that the 
other side would out build them, which would lead to that side "winning", 
though neither side could use the weapons (Craig and LogevaIl2009). 
Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars" 
This idea was announced on March 23, 1983 by Ronald Reagan. 
The Strategic Defense Initiative was an effort by the United States to create a 
space based missile defense system that could provide near total defense 
against a massive ICBM attack. The idea was developed as a response to the 
current Soviet-US doctrine of MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction (Craig 
and Logevall 2009). 
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The United States had the idea that such a system could take the 
world back from the brink of nuclear armageddon if Soviet ICBMs could be 
destroyed from space before they reached their targets. Opponents from both 
the United States and the Soviet Union argued that the system would serve 
only to further destabilize the situation as it would neutralize the Soviet 
Union's ICBMs, thus making the Soviet Union vulnerable to attack with no 
way to retaliate (Cochran et al. 1995). The Soviet Union might launch a 
preemptive attack in order to prevent the SDI system from coming online, 
which would in turn force the United States to react; the ensuing escalation of 
force would create the very situation that the SDI system was supposed to 
stop-- nuclear armageddon. 
The United States publicly announced that it was going to create this 
system, thereby allowing the Soviet Union the chance to disrupt the work 
with a preemptive attack. On the surface this could be construed as a foolish 
move by allowing one's enemy to know that one is going to achieve a 
technological advantage over them, but upon further investigation it could be 
considered a brilliant gamble. 
By announcing one country is going to outclass their enemy 
technologically, that country is forced to make one of three choices: they can 
either watch their hugely expensive weapons investment and defensive 
system become obsolete, leaving them vulnerable to attack and weakening 
their ability to intimidate or force their point of view, they can attack 
preemptively in order to prevent the weapon system from coming online, an 
act which will probably lead to their destruction too, or they can invest huge 
sums of energy and time in developing a counter to the weapon (Craig and 
Logevall 2009). 
The third choice is the one the Soviet Union took. It could not allow 
the signal of the United States achieving weapons superiority to be sent to the 
rest of the world. It began spending millions of dollars on ways to defeat the 
US SDI system-millions of dollars that it could not afford to keep spending 
on weapons research. The United States also began spending billions on 
research for the SDI project. The more money the United States spent on the 
SDI specifically and weapons in general, forced the Soviet Union to spend 
more in an attempt to keep up. (Craig and Logevall 2009; Snyder 1995). 
Yet many weapons experts maintain that SDI was nothing but a 
fantasy. Most of the technology needed to make such a system feasible was 
only in its infancy during the 1980s and many thought it would take decades 
before even the most basic goals of the program could be achieved (Snyder 
1995). 
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The United States was signaling to the Soviet Union that it would 
render its nuclear weapons useless and spent billions convincing them that it 
could do it, yet no operational version of SDI was ever created. It was signal 
of technological superiority that was costly but inherently false, as even 
today being able to shoot down a small nuclear warhead hurtling towards the 
earth from the upper atmosphere at a few miles per second is a spotty 
proposition at best. 
Conclusion 
Signaling theory has been applied to conflict situations in the past 
when dealing with hunter-gatherer groups (Roscoe 2009), and has also been 
applied to the monuments constructed by prehistoric cultures (Trigger 1990). 
In this paper I have shown how signaling theory can be applied to modem 
nation states and conflicts between them. The use of signaling theory can 
help with the understanding of complex political situations by simplifying the 
reasons why a nation may act a certain way or engage in a certain activity, 
therefore making it easier to understand. However, when applying signaling 
theory to these situations, one must remember that diplomatic relations 
between two countries are extremely complex and caution must be used 
before simplifying a situation to the point of inanity. 
In the case of the Soviet Union the expense of maintaining and 
building nuclear weapons and other military assets, coupled with poor 
economic policies drove them into bankruptcy (Craig and Logvall 2009; 
Snyder 1995). The desire of the Soviet Union's government to maintain the 
external and internal signal of equal, if not superior, strength compared with 
the United States drove their country to collapse. The Soviet Union was able 
to maintain the quality of their signal of strength until the end despite its 
economic difficulties. The quality of this signal was shown when the United 
States was taken by surprise by the Soviet Union's collapse, as it believed 
that the Soviet Union was still a strong, viable nation. This signal of strength 
sent by the Soviet Union is another example of a costly signal being false. 
The signaling between the United States and the Soviet Union has 
also left a physical signature that will enter the archaeological record as time 
goes by. The massive missile silo complexes built by both nations, of steel 
and reinforced concrete, were built to withstand nuclear weapon blasts. The 
same technology that would have allowed the bunkers and silos to survive a 
nuclear blast has also made them too expensive to destroy (Schofield 2009). 
Recent nuclear missile reduction treaties have lessened the need for so many 
silos and so the missiles have been removed and the missile doors left open 
so Russian satellites can confirm that they are empty. Some of the silos and 
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bunkers have been sold to civilians as apocalypse proof homes, and to 
corporations as secure storage for server farms. The rest are empty, too 
expensive to destroy. These silos will last for decades, perhaps hundreds of 
years, silent concrete testaments to a time when two nations had the capacity 
to destroy the world several times over. 
The Berlin Wall has also left a mark in the material record. Parts of 
the wall are preserved in order for future generations to see how the wall was 
during the Cold War. Also many fragments of the wall were taken as 
souvenirs by both East and West Germans. It could be that these fragments 
will be passed on through the generations as mementos of a different time. 
The propaganda efforts of both nations will also leave a material 
record (Belmonte 2008). Recordings of the radio and television messages still 
exist and efforts should be made to ensure they are preserved, along with any 
paper records that may still exist. And as classified information becomes 
unclassified in both nations, efforts should be made to preserve those records 
as well. The vast radio towers and satellites used in the propaganda efforts 
will most likely not leave a large archaeological signature as radio towers 
require heavy maintenance in order to even stay standing, and unless they are 
adapted to serve other purposes they will most likely be deconstructed, the 
materials used in their construction recycled (Snyder 1995). Satellites are 
equally as fragile, as their fuel supplies run out and newer technology comes 
on line, the satellites of the Cold War will fall back into the atmosphere 
(burning up as they do), leaving nothing behind (Snyder 1995). 
Any physical remnants of the signals discussed in this paper should 
be seriously considered for preservation as their preservation will give future 
archaeologists an opportunity to answer new questions that may arise about 
how powerful nations signal to each other, and also to allow current 
archaeologists to educate the public and answer their own questions about 
how nations prepared for war (Schofield 2009). 
Signaling theory can be applied to conflicts between modem nation 
states and it can help with our understanding of the conflicts and why certain 
actions were taken by certain groups in the past. Nation -states, like 
individuals, signal to both people inside and outside of their borders, to show 
their fitness in order achieve their goals. 
For future research, an analysis of the signals sent between the 
Soviet Union and the United States-both direct communications and 
defensive structures built in response to perceived threats-could help to 
identify a signature of a nation or group that feels threatened. Also, the 
application of signaling theory to this conflict has shown that costly signals 
can be faked, as was shown with the supposed development of the Strategic 
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Defense Initiative or the Soviet Union's signals of strength and stability near 
its collapse. This signature could be used to analyze the material remains in 
the archaeological record in order to determine if a group was preparing for 
war or existed with real or imagined threats, and help us to understand what 
was happening in the past. 
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